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SUMMARY
With the failure of the Rambouillet peace
talks and violence against ethnic Albanian
civilians escalating, on March 24, 1999
NATO began Operation Allied Force air-
strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. 
In all, NATO aircraft flew over 37,000 sorties
in the 78-day air campaign.  At the end of the
campaign about 1,100 aircraft were participat-
ing, with the United States contributing about
725.  Of the total aircraft, about 535 were
strike aircraft, (U.S. 323/Allied 213).  Thirteen
of NATO’s 19 nations  contributed aircraft to
the operation, with 8 nations’ aircraft flying
combat missions. The only NATO fatalities in
Operation Allied Force were two U.S. Apache
helicopter pilots killed in a training accident in
Albania.
With the air campaign escalating, on
June 4, 1999, Yugoslavia accepted a peace
proposal devised at a G-8 summit, and on
June 8, signed a military-technical agreement
with NATO officials providing for the with-
drawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo
and turning military control of  the province
over to NATO’s peacekeeping forces (KFOR).
On June 10, 1999, the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1244 endorsed the peace settle-
ment and “an international security presence
with substantial NATO participation.”
Dubbed Operation Joint Guardian,
KFOR totals about 30,000 in Kosovo, The
United States has about 2,500 troops in Koso-
vo and 1,000 troops in near-by countries
providing support to operations in both Koso-
vo and Bosnia.  The U.S. has suffered no
casualties from hostile action.  
Albanian insurgencies in southern Serbia
and Macedonia led NATO to permit the re-
introduction of the Yugoslav army into the
Ground Safety Zone around Kosovo, and
increase efforts to seal the Kosovo border.
Subsequently the Presavo Valley insurgents
signed an amnesty agreement with the Serb
government.  In Macedonia, the Albanian
nationalists  and the government have reached
an agreement that would grant many of the
insurgents’ demands for equal political status,
pending parliamentary approval.  NATO
troops have assisted in the voluntary collec-
tion the nationalists’ arms, and will continue
to maintain a small operation (450) dubbed
Allied Harmony to monitor the peace agree-
ment.   The European Union assumed com-
mand of this mission on April 1, 2003.
Congressional concerns have focused on
the impact of Balkan operations on overall
military readiness, and whether there has been
an equitable distribution of responsibilities
among the NATO allies or if the United States
needs to participate in KFOR at all.  Congress
has appropriated approximately $8.63 billion
for Kosovo operations through FY2003.  In
keeping with congressional direction, costs for
Balkan peacekeeping operations after FY2002
are no longer separately budgeted, but rather
are included in the individual armed services
regular operating budgets.  For FY2004, DOD





On April 1, responsibility for  the peace-keeping mission in Macedonia transferred from
NATO to the European Union.  The EU force in Macedonia , dubbed Operation Concordia,
will comprise 320 military and 80 civilian personnel, and be under French command.
U.S. troops in Kosovo total about 2,500 representing about 10% of the 25,000 NATO
and non-NATO troops deployed.  Other nations contributing large contingents include Italy,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background
Once an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has a 90% ethnic
Albanian population.  It nevertheless holds an emotional place in Serbian nationalist
tradition.  As part of his nationalist program, Yugoslav President Milosevic revoked
Kosovo’s autonomous status, putting it under control of the Serbian-dominated Belgrade
government.  An armed ethnic Albanian resistance movement developed, led by the so-called
Kosovo Liberation Army.  The Belgrade government responded in early 1998 with counter-
insurgency operations, with Yugoslav military  ground units and aircraft destroying villages
and executing civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents. 
In 1998, NATO political leaders turned their attention to the Kosovo region because of
the flow of refugees into Western Europe and Albania (itself destabilized by regional
uprisings in 1997), and concerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). FYROM, an independent nation bordering Kosovo to the
southeast,  also has a large Albanian population  alienated from its central government. 
In May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, directed accelerated
assessment of “a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic
campaign of violent repression in Kosovo.” Options considered included; 1) preventative
deployments in Albania and FYROM to stabilize the borders; 2) declaration of no-fly/no tank
zones in Kosovo and enforcement of them with NATO air forces; 3) direct military
intervention either through airstrikes or ground troops deployments; and 4) peacekeeping
deployments in the event of a political resolution.  On June 15, 1998, NATO launched a 6-
hour overflight of Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  Code-named
Determined Falcon, the exercise involved 80 aircraft from 13 NATO air forces (Canada,
Luxembourg, and Iceland not participating), and was conducted from 15 airbases in 5
countries. Twenty-seven U.S. land and carrier-based aircraft took part.
On September 24, 1998, NATO defense ministers authorized an “activation warning”
for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. On October 12, NATO defense
ministers authorized an “activation order,” placing the necessary forces under the NATO
command.  The following day, it was announced that U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke had
negotiated an agreement with Serbian leader Milosevic that postponed the threat of airstrikes
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if the Serbian government 1) would reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to “pre-
crisis” levels; 2) permit unarmed NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to
an international force of 2,000 unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4)
begin meaningful negotiations towards Kosovar autonomy.
Meaningful negotiations never took place, owing to recalcitrance on both sides, and
sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian
civilians.  Concerned over escalating violence, and its possible spread to other areas of the
Balkans, on January 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized Secretary-General Solana to order
airstrikes anywhere in Yugoslavia, if the warring Serb and Albanian factions had not reached
a peace settlement by February 20.
The “Contact Group,” an informal forum of representatives from the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia dealing with Balkan crises, devised a
framework for a peace settlement. They did not wish to encourage continued fighting for
Kosovar independence, but rather sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo’s autonomy
within Yugoslavia.  However, the Serb government did not agree to the framework, the so-
called Rambouillet Agreement, and the talks adjourned. 
During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved
out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional
Serb troops massed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian
civilians escalating, on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and
Kosovo. These airstrikes were the first military offensive action undertaken by NATO
without specific U.N. endorsement.  U.N. Security Council approval was not sought because
both Russia and China, each with veto power on the Council, continue to oppose the use of
force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The September 23, 1998 U.N. Security Council resolution,
which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did,
however, reference the U.N. Charter’s Article VII, which permits military force to maintain
international security.
NATO defined five conditions for ending it air campaign:
! Cessation of Serb operations against the Albanians in Kosovo;
! Withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;
! Acceptance of Kosovar democratic self-government;
! Acceptance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force; and
! Return of Kosovar refugees.
On May 6 1999, at the G-8 economic summit, a another set of principles for a peace
settlement were agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia.  Russian acceptance was regarded as a major step forward
in increasing the pressure on Milosevic to accede to NATO demands.  These G-8 principles
were:
! Immediate end to the violence.
! Withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other security forces.
! Deployment of  UN- endorsed international civil and security presences.
! Interim international administration with U.N. Security Council approval.
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! Return of all refugees, and access for aid organizations.
! Substantial self-government for Kosovo.
! Economic development of the region.
On June 4,1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace
plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical
Agreement (MTA) which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces form
Kosovo by June 20, 1999, and details the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the
peace agreement with all means necessary.  On June 10 1999, the United Nations Security
Council passed a resolution (No. 2580), endorsing the peace-keeping mission under Chapter
VII of the U.N.  Charter, which authorizes the use of force.  Also on June 10, NATO




On March 24, 1999, NATO began air operations, code-named Operation Allied Force,
against targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo.  DOD defined the mission as attacking the
Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian
Kosovars and degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations.  Target
selection focused on airfields, air defense and communication centers, military barracks, and
some equipment production facilities. Attacks then extended to logistical support facilities
and lines of resupply, Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo, and the national electrical and
television systems. In total, NATO aircraft flew over 35,000 sorties (1 aircraft flight), about
one-third of which were strike sorties, launching about 23,000 munitions.  Initially, cloudy
weather over Kosovo severely hampered attack aircraft equipped with laser-guided
munitions, and also reduced the ability to locate and target Yugoslav ground units.  In
addition to the weather conditions, a strong concern over minimal risk to NATO pilots
dictated that low-level flights to attack ground units not be undertaken until Serb air defenses
had been sufficiently degraded.  The  desire to avoid any collateral civilian casualties (Serb
or Albanian) also constrained targeting.
NATO HQ acknowledged that the air campaign did not impede the Serb operations to
drive the Albanian population from Kosovo.  The inability to stop Serb operations brought
strong criticism of the decision to launch the air campaign while completely ruling out any
use of ground forces.  Aside from official NATO and Administration spokesmen, few, if any,
observers believed that air power alone could  achieve the desired objectives.  Press reports
indicated that NATO political leaders were cautioned of an air campaign’s potential
shortfalls, but believed that domestic public opinion would not support a ground invasion of
Kosovo.  It was then perceived as a choice between “do nothing” or proceed with air strikes.
Some also suggested that in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, some advocates have
overemphasized the capabilities of air power, encouraging the belief that ground forces are
no longer as crucial to achieving military objectives.
There was also criticism that “command by committee” hampered NATO military
leaders’ ability to wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign.  Target lists, weapons
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used, and forces deployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments.  This
slowed decisionmaking, constrained operations, and sometimes emphasized political over
military considerations.  However, NATO officials maintain that SACEUR  received all
resources requested, and emphasized that this consensual process was critical to ensuring the
cohesion of the alliance. A more fundamental criticism is that the air campaign’s actual
objective from the start was political, not military — i.e., to bring President Milosevic back
to the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributed to a constrained, incremental approach to
targeting. 
After the air operation, Secretary Cohen, SACEUR Gen. Clark, and the Chairman of
NATO’s Military Committee Gen. Klaus Naumann all recommended that NATO’s decision-
making processes for conducting a military campaign be examined and, in some way,
streamlined.  None, however, offered specific suggestions, noting that any changes made
would have to gain and sustain acceptance by all NATO members.  NATO’s current structure
and procedures were created to deal with homeland defense against invasion.  Out-of-area
operations like Allied Force present different political constraints and military requirements.
Some have suggested greater delegation of authority to SACEUR, once the alliance has made
the decision to carry out a military operation.  However, within an alliance of democracies
which maintains full consensus as a fundamental principle, this approach may not achieve
acceptance.  In addressing this issue, Gen. Clark emphasized that, structural reforms aside,
“there has to be a strong political consensus founded on a common perception of military
doctrine to overcome the obstacles we hit in the air campaign”. (Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing, July 20, 1999)
In responding to the critics of the air campaign, Gen. Naumann has noted that NATO
planned for a limited operation from the outset, and made this fact public, while President
Milosevic “planned for a war”.  Naumann also observed that NATO threatened military
action, without  having a consensus on how it would be carried out, thereby precluding its
military commanders’ use of “overwhelming force from the beginning.”  (Defense News,
July 20, 1999)
In the wake of the Yugoslav acceptance of NATO peace conditions, supporters of
reliance upon NATO airpower believe they have been vindicated in their approach.  They
emphasize that NATO sustained no combat fatalities in the course of the 78-day campaign,
and that the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was achieved.  The air
campaign’ critics, however, point to the fact that it did not prevent the expulsion of almost
the entire Albanian population of Kosovo.
The Department of Defense Joint Staff provided the following initial statistical
summary of the 78-day air campaign:
Total sorties: 37,200
! U.S.: 23,208 (62%)
! Allies: 13,992 (38%)
Strike sorties:  9,500
! U.S.: 5,035 (53%)




! U.S.: 948 (79%)
! Allies: 252 (21%)
Support sorties: 26,500
! U.S.: 17,225 (65%)
! Allies: 9,275 (35%)
On October 14, 2000, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton provided the Senate Armed
Services Committee with DOD’s preliminary “lessons learned” observations
[http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/lessons/acw.html].  The final version Report to
Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report  was issued January 31, 2000
shortly before the FY2001 budget submission.  Among the issues addressed, were the
following:
! Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated
operational planning and maintenance of unity of command. Disparities
between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike,
mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities impeded
U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.
! DoD needs to develop options for earlier and more efficient use of  its
reserve forces.
! DoD systems for planning and executing transportation of its forces were
strained by the rapidly evolving requirements.
! The heavy commitment of NATO’s air defense suppression forces indicates
the  need to find innovative and affordable ways to exploit our technological
skills in electronic combat.
! Success using the latest generation of air-delivered munitions systems in
Kosovo validates plans to increase inventories.
! Task Force Hawk (U.S. ground troops in Albania) pointed out the need to
regularly experiment with the independent use of key elements of all of our
forces without their usual supporting elements. 
! Improved unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission planning, improved
processes for interaction between UAV operators and manned aircraft,
frequent and realistic training opportunities, and equipment upgrades for
individual UAVs all would benefit force effectiveness.
! Humanitarian operations highlighted  the importance of such resources as
linguists and civil affairs personnel, engineering assets capable of
emergency repair of roads and bridges in very  austere environments,
detailed maps,  and prepositioned stocks
Ground Force Operations — KFOR (Operation Joint Guardian) 
Because air operations did not stop Serb operations against Kosovar Albanians, public
discussion of NATO ground force intervention was widespread.  U.S. and NATO spokesmen
continued to maintain there was no intention to introduce ground troops without “a
permissive environment.”  In the latter weeks of the air campaign, the British government
began to push  for ground intervention, but was unable to win the support of other alliance
members.  Though President Clinton and others publically made the point that no option was
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permanently “off the table”, and NATO HQ re-examined the military requirements for an
invasion of Kosovo and even Serbia, at no time did there appear alliance-wide support of
offensive ground operations.  Indeed, several member governments, particularly Greece,
Italy, and Germany were publically adamant in their opposition.
With the Yugoslav acceptance of the peace plan devised by the G-8 and proposed to the
Yugoslav government by Finnish President Ahtisaari, the focus turned to Operation Joint
Guardian, the peace-keeping mission to be undertaken by KFOR. To facilitate this operation,
NATO obtained the Yugoslav acceptance of a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)
prepared by NATO on June 9, 1999.  The following day, the United Nations Security
Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an “international
security presence” in Kosovo for its enforcement.  On the same day, June 10 , NATO
Secretary-General Solana reported that Serb forces were beginning to withdraw from Kosovo
and ordered suspension of the air campaign.  On June 17, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav
troops and police complete, NATO officially terminated the air campaign.
KFOR did not begin deploying into Kosovo until June 12, 1999, reportedly waiting to
synchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid co-mingling
forces.  This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-strong contingent of Russian troops to
leave their SFOR station in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital.
Reportedly planned by the Russian General Staff, and endorsed by president Yeltsin, to
ensure Russia a high-profile role in KFOR. This action occasioned high-level U.S.-Russian
negotiations.  An agreement reached on June 18, 1999 provides for shared control of Pristina
airport operations, with Russian participation in airport ground operations and air operations
under KFOR control.  In addition, Russia deploys troops in the U.S., German, and French
sectors.  These troops are  be under a unified KFOR command, with a Russian general officer
at KFOR HQ.  Russia does not have an independent territorial sector as it initially demanded.
NATO refused to grant Russia an independent territorial sector, believing that could be the
first step toward a permanent partitioning of the province.  To date, KFOR commanders have
praised the Russian troops for their professionalism. 
Military-Technical Agreement (MTA).  After some initial recalcitrance, Yugoslav
military officials signed the MTA on June 9, 1999.  The MTA affirms the terms of the peace
plan, and provides specific details of its implementation.  Some of the main provisions are:
! KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance.
! KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain
a secure environment, and to carry out its mission, the KFOR commander
has the right to compel the removal or  relocation of forces and weapons,
and to order the cessation of any activities that pose a potential threat to
KFOR, its mission, or a third party.  Failure to comply will result in military
action, including the use of necessary force.
! KFOR has the right to monitor and inspect all facilities or activities that may
have a police or military capability, or are deemed otherwise relevant to
compliance. The KFOR commander is the “final authority” for the
interpretation of the MTA.
! Air and Ground Safety Zones will extend 25 and 5 kilometers respectively
beyond the borders of Kosovo, and no Yugoslav forces, aside from local
police, may enter these zones without KFOR permission. All Yugoslav
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military, paramilitary, and police forces will conduct a phased withdrawal
from Kosovo, to be completed by June 20, 1999.
! Yugoslav forces will mark and remove all mines, booby traps, and obstacles
as they withdraw. A subsequent, separate agreement will address the return
of “agreed Yugoslav and Serb personnel.”
KFOR Operations.  KFOR command now rotates every six months, and is currently
held by Italian General Fabio Mini.  KFOR divided the province into five territorial sectors
under the command of British, German, French, Italian, and U.S. contingents.  Other nations’
contingents are assigned to one of these sectors. (For current national contingents, see below)
In early 1999, KFOR nations quietly withdrew troops, reducing KFOR standing
deployment  from close to 50,000 to about 37,000 troops in Kosovo and 5,000 support forces
in neighboring countries. .  Those nations with notable withdrawals were France, Russia, and
the United Kingdom.  The other large contingents, Germany and the United States, remained
relatively constant. 
On June 20 1999, NATO announced an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army
for its phased disbanding.  The presence of armed KLA guerillas has given KFOR some
concerns, and KFOR has disarmed KLA groups that could have presented a threat to
security.  In the demilitarization agreement, the KLA agreed to:
! Renounce the use of force and comply with KFOR and U.N. Interim Civil
Administration directives. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts,
including reprisals or detentions.
! Acknowledge KFOR’s use of necessary force to ensure compliance.
! Not carry weapons in specified areas.
In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and U.N.
officials agreed to the creation of the Kosovo Corps.  NATO and the U.N. intend the 3,000-
strong organization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations such
as forest fires, search and rescue, and reconstruction. Some KLA leaders see the Kosovo
Corps as the nucleus of a future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and U.N. officials.
Albanian Insurgency – Presevo Valley and Macedonia
Presevo Valley. The Military Technical Agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO
established a 3-mile Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) along the Kosovo-Serbia border within
which no Yugoslav armed forces, and only lightly armed Yugoslav police, were allowed. The
GSZ is outside of Kosovo, and the Military Technical Agreement has no provision for KFOR
to conduct operations in it, though KFOR was to monitor it from the Kosovo border to
ensure no re-entry of Yugoslav forces.  In 2000, Albanian nationalists from Kosovo took
advantage of the security vacuum in the GSZ’s Presevo Valley area to train and organize
insurgents among the predominately Albanian population.  In late 2000, the first indications
of insurgency came with attacks by the self-proclaimed Liberation Army of Presevo,
Medvedya, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) against the Yugoslav police in the region. KFOR HQ
and U.S. commanders particularly came under criticism for not interdicting the passage of
men and arms across the Kosovo border in their sector.  KFOR HQ emphasized that it had
no mandate to conduct operations outside of Kosovo proper, and consequently could not
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intervene against the UCPMB in the Ground Safety Zone.  British troops were transferred
from their Central Sector to augment U.S. forces, and to conduct foot patrols in an attempt
to strengthen border controls.  In addition, NATO, citing the fall of Milosevic and the
cooperative attitude of the new Kostunica government in Belgrade, negotiated an agreement
for the “conditioned, phased” return of Yugoslav armed forces to the Ground Safety Zone
to fill the security vacuum.  Monitored by European Union representatives, limited numbers
of Yugoslav Army personnel have re-emtered the GSZ, though without  tanks, armored cars,
artillery, or helicopters, and the insurgents have signed a with the Belgrade government.
Macedonia. Negotiations between the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanian
political representatives have overcome the stumbling blocks regarding the official status of
the Albanian language and the structure of police forces, and a peace agreement has been
reached that would address many of the insurgents concerns.  In response, the insurgents
have voluntarily turned over a substantial amount of  their weaponry to NATO troops in
Operation Task Force Harvest. In total,  3,875 weapons, including four tanks and armored
personnel carriers were turned in.  NATO has agreed to maintain a contingent in Macedonia
to oversee implementation of the peace agreement.  Dubbed Task Force Allied Harmony, the
700-strong contingent is currently under German command, and is to be replaced in early
2003 by a European Union military contingent.
Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian
Within NATO, each nation participating in Operation Allied Force assumed the cost
of  its own operations.  NATO does not provide estimates of the overall cost of the operation
or of the cost of each member’s contributions.  (For individual national cost estimates for
Kosovo operations, see CRS Report RL30398, NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: a
Preliminary Report.)  Individual nations also assume the full cost of the deployments in
support of on-going KFOR operations.
Congressional Appropriations.  In April 1999, the Administration submitted a
$6.05 billion emergency supplemental appropriation request to cover military operations in
Kosovo and continuing air operations in Southwest Asia during FY1999.  On May 18, 1999,
the House approved a House-Senate conference agreement on H.R. 1141, providing $14.9
billion in FY1999 supplemental appropriations.    On May 20 1999, the  Senate concurred.
It was signed into law (P.L. 106-31) on May 21.  Of this, only $10.8 billion was defense-
related,  and included funds for items other than Kosovo operations such as a military pay
raise, military construction, training, and equipment/munitions procurement.  The
Administration’s funding request assumed offensive military operations against Yugoslavia
through September 1999.  With the campaign ending in June, DOD calculated its actual
FY1999 incremental costs to be $3.0 billion, and the remainder of the appropriated
supplemental were re-programmed.
The Administration’s FY2000 budget request contained no funds for combat or
peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.  The House Armed Services Committee expressed its
concern that under or unbudgeted contingency operations have diverted funds from “quality
of life, readiness, and modernization” programs.  Seeing no funds budgeted for Kosovo
operations in FY2000, and seeking to ensure that incremental Kosovo-related costs would
be dealt with only through specific budgeted accounts or supplemental appropriations, the
Committee inserted a provision in DOD’s  authorizing legislation (H.R. 1401) prohibiting
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the use of any funds authorized by the legislation for military operations in Yugoslavia. On
June 9, during consideration on the House floor, Representative Skelton introduced an
amendment removing this provision.  Upon receiving written notice from President Clinton
stating that if military readiness were to be harmed by on-going operational requirements,
he would submit a FY2000 budget amendment request, the House agreed (270-155) to
remove the funding prohibition.  A $2 billion supplemental appropriation for Kosovo was
subsequently included in  the FY2001 Military Construction Act (H.R. 4425;P.L. 106-246).
 The FY2001 DOD appropriations legislation (H.R. 4576;P.L.106-259) provided $1.7
billion for Kosovo, as requested.
Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no
longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual
service budgets.  Consequently, published DOD budget documents do not provide a separate
accounting for these operations.  In the FY2002 DOD appropriations conference report (
H.Rept. 107-350), did note that $2.13 billion was appropriated for both Balkan operations,
a reduction without comment of $600 million from the Administration’s request.  The DOD
FY2004 budget justification materials for contingency operations notes a request of $936
million for Kosovo operations.  
(For more information, see CRS Report RL30505: Appropriations for FY2001: Defense
and CRS Report RL30457: Supplemental Appropriations for FY2000: Plan Colombia,
Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance, and Other Initiatives.) 
LEGISLATION
H.R. 1588 (Hunter, D. et al.)
To authorize appropriations for FY2004 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal
year 2004, and for other purposes. Introduced Apr. 3, 2003; referred to Committee on Armed
Services.
S. 1050 (Warner, J.W.)
To authorize appropriations for FY2004 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal
year 2004, and for other purposes. Introduced May 13, 2003; referred to Committee on
Armed Services.  Passed Senate May 22, amended.  Incorporated in H.R. 1588.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Reports
CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and U.S. Policy,  by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel.
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World Wide Web Sites
The following WWW sites provide additional information:
KFOR Headquarters — [http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html]
NATO Headquarters — [http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press.htm]
U.S. European Command — [http://www.eucom.mil]
